



n November 8th, 1920, when Vladimir Tatlin 
exhibited his Monument to the Third Interna-
tional a banner on the wall of the Mosaics 
Studio at the former Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg 
proclaimed, “Engineers-Bridge Builders! Make Calcu-
lations for the Creation of New Forms.” In June of that 
same year, artists gathered in Germany for the Berlin 
Dada Fair and paid homage to the work of the Russian 
Constructivist and to the new revolutionary aesthetic. 
A well-known photograph shows Georges Grosz and 
John Heartfield holding up the slogan: “Art is Dead! 
Long Live the Machine Art of Tatlin!” The work of 
these avant-garde artists employed different methods, 
yet at that moment in the 1920s it was driven and 
sustained by a common belief: technology suggested 
a new way of creating artistic form, a new way of 
seeing and perceiving culture. More than a rejection or 
dissolution of the tradition-laden past, these artists 
conceived technology as a literal origin, a new begin-
ning, a beginning from ground zero, a birth. “We grow 
out of iron,” writes Aleksei Gastev. This parable of 
absolute self-creation functions as a model for what is 
meant by technology among the early twentieth-century 
avant-garde. For technology becomes a metaphor of 
origin and radical change, referring both to formal 
invention and to sources of life. It functions to declare 
the modernity of modem art.
Now, from the perspective of technologically 
advanced cultures of the West, it seems increasingly 
difficult to avoid the sense that somehow the whole 
world has changed, has become new again. Thus, for 
example, Jean Baudrillard can speak of “the mutation 
of a properly industrial society into what could be 
called our techno-culture.” Technology comes increas-
ingly to be seen as a matter of cultural data and a sense 
that a change has taken place often seems directly 
related to a sense of being immersed in a sort of tech-
nological complexity—to that commonly observed 
sense of being in the matrix. This perceived change has 
frequently been figured in terms of postmodemity, that 
is, as part of a broader shift from modem to post-
modern. But then, the very notions of modernity and 
postmodemity seem inconceivable without technology.
That is not to say, however, that technology determines 
modem or postmodern culture. Rather, the changes that 
have occurred in contemporary culture seem to be 
based less on technology as such, than on the very 
concept or essence of technology.
There have been numerous discussions about 
technology and the way it has transformed, and contin-
ues to transform, the way we live, act and communi-
cate. Wired, Time, Newsweek and many other maga-
zines have ran articles and covers on cyber-punk, 
genetical engineering, techno-culture, techno-fetishism, 
robotics, new media, artificial life, and virtual reality. 
Nor have scholars ignored the issue, even if their 
discussions have often taken place under the broader 
rubric of “postmodern culture” or “techno-culture.” 
Yet, despite the sheer mass of arguments about technol-
ogy and techno-culture, they seem to have a striking 
uniformity: technology or some aspect of it is either 
celebrated or decried, cast as utopian or dystopian, in 
terms of its capacity to either serve humanity or to 
threaten it. The repetitiveness of these arguments, I 
would venture, results from the fact that they take the 
definition of technology for granted. For all the discus-
sion of the implications of technological change, 
remarkably little attention has been devoted to possible 
changes in the concept of technology itself.
What has been left unexamined, I would like to 
suggest, is precisely Heidegger’s “question concerning 
technology,” which is not the question of technology 
per se, but what he calls “the essence of technology,” 
which “is by no means anything technological.”' For 
Heidegger, this “essence” of technology cannot simply 
be defined in terms of the usual, modem sense of 
technology as an instrument, a tool, or a machine. He 
attempts, instead, to broaden the definition of technol-
ogy into a more general concept of making, or produc-
ing, and finds that in the Greek root of technology, 
techne (generally translated as art, skill, or craft),
'See, for example, R. L. Rutsky, High Techne: Art and 
Technology’ from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 1-3.
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technology and art were closely linked. For the Greeks, 
“it was not technology alone that bore the name 
techne," but art, too, “was simply called techne." 
Heidegger’s, point, of course, is not that technology’s 
close relationship to art has been lost. Rather, he argues 
that the modem conception of technology restricts the 
definition of the technological to the instrumental, and 
“blinds us to” that broader essence which informs not 
only the modem view of technology, but also the 
techne of Ancient Greece. Thus, for Heidegger the 
question concerning technology is a historical question. 
The history of modernity, he says, can be read as an 
ever-increasing technological effort to regulate and 
secure the unsettling, “artistic” aspects inherent in the 
techne—to direct it toward instrumental ends. The very 
notion of modernity has been defined in terms of an 
instrumental conception of technology, an instrumental 
or technological rationality that allows modem human-
ity to know and control the world. From this perspec-
tive, that which is not technological cannot be modem.2
If however, Heidegger questions the “universality” 
of the instrumental concept of technology by pointing 
to its historical specificity (as modem), he does not 
mention the extent to which it is also culturally spe-
cific. Modernity, defined in terms of instrumental 
technology, has long been the basis on which Western, 
patriarchal cultures have privileged themselves over 
their “nontechnological others.” From this perspective, 
cultures or discourses—for example, “non-Westem” 
cultures and “feminine” discourses that perceive the 
world in terms other than those of rational, scientific 
knowledge are necessarily characterized as anti-mod-
em, irrational, “primitive.” Thus, although the sense of 
change may be specific to “highly technologized” 
cultures, its implications are not; for if in the new 
technology the modem concept of technology has 
changed, so too has the relation of “techno-culture” to 
those supposedly nontechnological “other” cultures and 
discourses that modernity has excluded or repressed.
Russia and the Soviet Union provide a vivid context 
in which to re-examine the relationship between 
technology and modem artistic production. This 
context is well described by literary scholar Robert 
Maguire when he writes about the Prometheanism and 
life-building of the early Russian twentieth century 
with their “fervent belief in the positive power of 
technology, in the human capacity to create, shape, and 
control one’s own destiny.” The technologist position 
is obvious in the work and statements of various artists 
from the Futurists and the Constructivists to the Smithy 
writers. As they understood it, the artists of the Russian 
avant-garde were producing models for restructuring
2 Ibid, 3-12.
the world on totally different principles. Technology 
played a vital role in this restructuring: not simply a 
promise of utopian bliss, it was mobilized to fulfill the 
political imperatives of a new socialist society.
Many Russian artists, however, found themselves 
at the crossroads of aesthetics and technology. In the 
works and statements of Malevich, Khlebnikov and 
others, one discerns an attempt to posit an autonomous, 
utopian aesthetic space—a ground of play, rescue and 
retreat—separate from the instrumentality of modern 
technicism and synonymous with artistic freedom. This 
context helps account for the following statement by 
Vladimir Tatlin, made in 1932 on the subject of his last 
significant work—a flying machine called Letatlin: “I 
don’t want people to take this thing as something 
utilitarian,” Tatlin says, “I have made it as an artist. 
Look at the bent wings. We believe them to be aestheti-
cally perfect. Or don’t you think that Letatlin gives an 
impression of aesthetic perfection? Like a hovering sea 
gull? Don’t you think?” Considering this, isn’t is 
possible to suggest that the Berlin Dadaists may have 
fatefully misread Tatlin’s effort, and that despite its 
insistence on mechanical forms and intended use the 
Monument was intended as a failed machine, an 
allegory, evident in Tatlin’s use of the ascending 
spiral—a symbol of life itself? Isn’t it here that we 
discern another view of technology, one that has less to 
do with instrumentality, but with its failure, with the 
realm of aesthetics and art?
T
he workshop on “Art, Technology and Moder-
nity in Russia and Eastern Europe” set out to re-
examine the relationship between technology 
and aesthetics. It brought together literary scholars, 
film and architectural historians to suggest a more 
nuanced analysis of the role of technology in the 
artistic and political processes taking place in Russia, 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and to delineate 
the differences between the forms of modernity they 
imagined. The essays selected for the present volume 
are not limited to a single discipline or theoretical 
approach. But they are united by an attempt to articu-
late varieties of relationship between art and technol-
ogy in Russia and Eastern Europe which are neither 
utopian and filled with a plenitude that is easy to 
dismiss, nor equivalent to some kind of alienation as an 
‘other’ to historical modernism.
The need for such a re-examination has been 
suggested by many critics who see the work of cultural 
commentary as an effort to reconstitute the broad lines 
of historical development, rather than privileging 
particular moments, which have the nostalgic charm of 
the “Golden Age.” Cynthia Simmons is concerned with 
establishing the overall continuities within which the 
Russian experience of the twentieth century—so
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dramatic in its apparent cultural upheavals—can be 
made more intelligible. Dispensing with the convenient 
pretext that a rupture took place—a kind of a cultural 
lacuna from which we can avert our eyes—Simmons 
insists on a continuity between Russian Modernism and 
the official culture of the Soviet period, arguing that “it 
is specifically the representation and celebration of 
science and technology” that constitutes the link. This 
shift in perspective allows her to locate the origin of 
Russian postmodern thought not in the explorations of 
intertextuality, but in the collapse of the Soviet modem- 
ist/technological agenda. Viktor Pelevin’s Omon Ra, 
she argues, is a wry commentary on the failed promise 
of Soviet ideology, a “postmodern subversion of 
Soviet-style modernism with its privileging of technol-
ogy.”
To some extent, the essays in this volume can be 
read as a reappraisal of the Soviet critical heritage and 
as an illuminating and subversive commentary on the 
brief history of the Western reception of the Russian 
avant-garde. For example, in modernist history the poet 
Vladimir Maiakovskii might be said to epitomize 
modernism’s internationalist, rationally based ideology. 
And the history of Russian modernism welcomes him 
as an urbanist and a futurist, committed to technologi-
cal and social progress. Yet, when Maiakovskii appears 
in Julia Vaingurt’s essay, it is not as the great propa-
gandist of Soviet technological utopia, but as an artist 
deeply at odds with his country’s vision of the future. 
Analyzing Maiakovskii’s travelogue “My Discovery of 
America,” Vaingurt shows that for Maiakovskii tech-
nology and poetry are closely linked: both are ways of 
communicating, “two modes of mediation between his 
I an the world.” Maiakovskii’s trip to America unsettles 
his faith in technology; upon his return Maiakovskii 
finds himself transformed by the experience and urges 
his fellow artists “not to sing the praises of technology 
but to harness it in the name of the interests of human-
kind.” Vaingurt sees Maiakovskii’s new found human-
ism as a response to the psychic and sensory overload 
of the American metropolis. Her essay, significantly, 
attempts to encompass, rather than repress the conflict 
integral to the modernists’ attitudes toward technology.
Andrei Khrenov draws attention to the specificity of 
Soviet cultural practices and exposes the limitations of 
standard categories of cultural analysis. He shifts the 
discussion to architecture and cinema and focuses on 
Aleksandr Medvedkin’s 1937 film, New Moscow, 
which combined deliberately illusionistic and archaic 
forms of representation to represent Stalin’s plan for 
the city as a “dream of the future immanent in the 
present.” The essay provides a sharp sidelight on two 
opposite approaches which frame the discussion of the 
period: on the one hand, Boris Groys’s well-known 
argument that Stalinism was a continuation of the
Russian avant-garde, and on the other, the idea put 
forward by Western art historians that Stalinism 
liquidated avant-garde’s artistic achievements. Signifi-
cantly, Khrenov argues that the validity of these para-
digms is circumscribed by their particular cultural 
contexts, and that the specificity of Soviet visual 
culture provides unique material for revising and 
theorizing the functions of the visual in modernity.
Not one set of preconditions governs the range of 
arguments in this collection; there are, however, 
discourses held in common. The entire discussion is 
allied with a certain “anti-foundational” critique, that 
is, a critique of the historical concepts posited by a 
discipline (art history, for example) as its natural 
epistemological grounds. Kimberly Elman’s essay is a 
vivid example of a critical practice that opens up onto 
the question of method. Elman traces the architectural 
production of the Bat’a Shoe Company located in the 
Moravian town of Zlin from the early 1920s to 1938. 
She challenges previous analyses which regarded the 
Bat’a buildings within the context of the “International 
Style,” arguing that they represent a unique appropria-
tion of the American factory towns, a model which 
appealed to Bat’a not for its value as an instrument of 
social change, but simply as that which would generate 
profit. This analysis leads her to question the categories 
of “modem” and “avant-garde” as they are applied to 
the study of interwar architecture in Czechoslovakia 
and to the general investigations of modernity.
In conclusion, I would like to remark on the dual 
project of the workshop—to offer distinct approaches 
to the study of art and technology in the Slavic context 
as well as a reappraisal of the modernist heritage. I 
believe that these projects are inseparable and that 
concrete studies presented here are invaluable for new 
ways to understand modernity and our contemporary 
culture.
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